Boson sampling is a problem for which quantum devices could prove to go beyond classical computing using only linear optics and photon preparation and counting. While theoretically important, there is a lack of practical applications for this task. This paper presents a way to turn any boson sampling device for which there are certain fabrication limits into a physically unclonable function which could be used in identification systems and other security protocols. For a minimum fabrication error, there are scenarios for which the photon distribution at the output of two different devices has a minimum distance and they can be told apart. When compared to classical PUFs these linear optical tokens have the advantage that, for the right choice of parameters, there is a computational guarantee that no classical computer can simulate the output. The paper describes the basic limitations of boson sampling which allow these results and gives a possible choice for a challenge-response identification protocol. This gives a direct application of boson sampling which could be simpler than solving the general problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical unclonable functions, PUFs, are objects with unique properties which identify their holders. These objects, or tokens, undergo a series of measurements under different stimuli for which only the right device gives the correct answer to each challenge [1, 2] . The behaviour of a good physical unclonable function should be impossible to predict, even if we know how it behaves under previous measurements.
This paper proposes a physical unclonable function based on linear optical systems under quantum light. Predicting the output distribution of photons entering a linear optical device is called the boson sampling problem and, under certain assumptions, it is strongly believed to be extremely hard to simulate in a classical computer [3] .
If we can fabricate irreproducible linear optics tokens due, for instance, to manufacturing limits, the boson sampling problem can serve as the basis of a physical unclonable function which could be implemented with existing technology presenting increased security against simulation attacks. This gives a direct application of boson sampling with minimal additional requirements beyond the basic protocol.
II. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
Physical Unclonable Functions are physical tokens which, when subject to a certain physical stimulus, or challenge, give out a recognizable output, or response, which is stable for each particular token but highly variable between very similar PUFs so that each token seems to have a random response [2, 4] .
For instance, if we shine light through a slab of glass with random microscopic inhomogeneities comparable to * juagar@tel.uva.es the wavelength, the scattered light will form a seemingly random pattern. For any given slab, we cannot hope to predict the exact output speckle pattern, but each token is fixed and future measurements will produce almost identical outputs [1, [5] [6] [7] .
This can be used as the basis of an identification protocol. If we record challenge-response pairs storing the light detected at the output for different initial wavefronts, we can test anyone claiming to posses the token with a random challenge. If we choose our physical system with care, the only way to give the correct answer to all the challenges is having that particular physical token.
There are certain properties a good PUF should have: Unclonability: The responses to the input should result from hard to copy properties of the physical system. In the glass slab example, the scattered light comes from the interaction between the challenge input light with all the molecules and imperfections in the glass at scales comparable to the light wavelength. An impersonator would need to copy that structure to another device, which is deemed unfeasible.
Unclonability has two sides. First, there is a hardware, or physical, aspect. We want a system which cannot be copied exactly, even by the legitimate users or an attacker that gets hold of the token for a limited time. Second, there is a software, or mathematical, side. The token should be impossible to simulate. If we can predict the output, we can use a mock token with the same outputs, even if we generate them with a different system. Unpredictability: The answer to any of the challenges must be impossible to predict for an attacker who does not hold the PUF. The physical system implementing the PUF, apart from not being easy to simulate or clone, must allow a large enough challenge space. Crucically, a few challenges should not reveal the answer to future ones. We assume the attacker has access to previous legitimate challenge-response pairs.
A large challenge space means there are enough physical configurations to throw a new challenge at each identification attempt. Additionally, each challenge should be independent from the rest. For instance, if the responses to the challenges are linear combinations from a smaller basis, an attacker only needs to record a few challengeresponse pairs of the order of the size of the basis to be able deduce the response for any possible challenge.
There have been different candidates for the physical quantitity to measure (see [8] for a review). Among others, some systems use the existing manufacturing process variations in regular silicon chips and their effects in time delays or voltage thresholds [9] [10] [11] [12] , or introduce random optical [1, [5] [6] [7] or radiofrequency [13] [14] [15] scatterers and study the resulting field. There are also protocols for quantum readout of optical PUFs so that an eavesdropper cannot learn any information from the challenges [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] and detailed analyses of their resistance to forgery [22] .
Boson Sampling PUFs introduce a system which cannot be predicted by classical means. This property is based on strong computational results and gives an important advantage compared to many classical PUFs. Machine learning algorihms are quite successful at predicting the output of classical silicon PUFs [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . The challenge-response data, when combined with information from side channel attacks, permits to characterize the PUF better, allowing sometimes a direct predictive model [29] or improved machine learning attacks [30] [31] [32] [33] . Similarly, PUFs based on scattering in integrated optical circuits are subject to prediction using machine learning unless they include a non-linear scatterer [6] . There is an active search for simulation resistant PUFs [34] .
While non-linear systems might be difficult to predict, there are no guarantees that there cannot be an efficient simulation method. Boson sampling offers a physical system whose output cannot be predicted in a reasonable time under certain known conditions.
Here, I propose a system which would be secure even if the attacker gets hold of the token for a short time large enough to perfectly determine the unitary transformation it implements using known efficient methods [35] . Protection against physical cloning comes from limitations in the fabrication process and, without a good enough copy, simulation would require a full quantum computer to be efficient.
III. BOSON SAMPLING WITH LINEAR OPTICS
Linear optical devices can be completely characterized by their scattering matrix S which relates the amplitudes of the classical fields in the input and output ports of the device. For m distinct modes, an m×m matrix is enough.
For quantum inputs, the evolution depends on the number of photons. For n input photons, the states with the different ways of placing the n photons into the m modes form a basis of a Hilbert space of dimension M = m+n−1 n in which the state evolution is described as M × M unitary matrices U . The evolution U can be described in terms of the permanents of different submatrices of S [36] .
We call a boson sampling problem instance BS(ψ, S) to the problem of determining the output probability distribution D S that describes the probability of finding each of the possible output states |n 1 n 2 . . . n m with n i photons in the ith mode and m i=0 = n for a particular scattering matrix S and an input state |ψ with n photons.
The distribution can be determined from relatively simple experiments with only linear optical elements and single photon generators and detectors, all within the reach of current technology with some limitations.
However, simulating the resulting photon distribution at the output with a classical computer is essentially as hard as computing the permament of a matrix, which is deemed infeasible. For random Gaussian m × m matrices S and input states |ψ with n 2 m photons, each in a different input port, boson sampling can be shown to be a P-hard problem for a classical computer [3, 37] .
A general purpose quantum computer could, in principle, solve the boson sampling problem with m log 2 n qubits (see Theorem 3.12. in [3] ), but we can also find a solution with a much simpler optical system which, unlike a scalable quantum computer with many qubits, can be realized with present-day technology.
This has sparked a great interest because it could lead to the first experimental proof of quantum supremacy: showing quantum devices can give solutions to problems for which classical computation is not efficient. There is a growing number of experimental demonstrations for a few photons [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] , but there are experimental challenges that have prevented a definite proof of quantum advantage. Apart from the theoretical and philosophical implications of such a demonstration, there have been some attempts to harness this quantum advantage of boson sampling for practical tasks with schemes for one-way functions [45] , private-key quantum cryptography [46] , certified quantum random numbers [47] and a black-box primitive for decision and function problems for their use in cryptography [48] .
IV. MAIN IDEA
I present an application of boson sampling to create a physical unclonable function whose behaviour cannot be predicted classically. The protection from quantum attacks assumes there are no general purpose quantum computers with many qubits, which seems quite ahead in the future, and that there are limitations in the manufacturing process of the boson sampling devices so that two devices cannot be fabricated to have the exact same scattering matrix S or even with scattering matrices with a matrix distance below a certain bound.
A boson sampling protocol with these irreproducible tokens can be turned into what is called a strong PUF [49] with multiple independent challenge-response pairs.
In fact, the proposed PUF takes known limitations in previous boson sampling devices [50] [51] [52] [53] and turns them into an advantage, much like quantum key distribution leverages the inherent uncertainty in the quantum measurement of non-orthohonal states.
V. BOSON SAMPLING PUFS
We start by assuming perfect boson sampling with imperfect optical devices and then we will consider the effect of practical problems, particularly losses.
The PUFs will be linear optics tokens which cannot be exactly reproduced due to manufacturing limitations so that, during boson sampling, these small differences in the scattering matrix S show in the resulting output boson distribution.
The distance between two linear devices S andS can be quantified using the operator distance of their scattering matrices
for all the possible unit vectors |ψ (equivalent to maximizing on any possible state).
The differences between the output distributions D S and DS can be quantified with the variation distance D S − DS 1 , which corresponds to the difference in the probability assigned by each distribution to the output state for which this difference is largest.
For boson sampling PUFs we will choose a pair of values of m and n for which it is deemed infeasible to build two devices with a small enough matrix distance S −S op , which translates into a difference in the output distributions D S and DS that makes it easy to tell apart the devices. The verifier can check the output distribution of a linear optical system under a particular challenge and compare the output distribution to the recorded response from the original token. If the variation distance is below a threshold, it will consider the response is correct. If it is above the threshold, the PUF is rejected.
In this regime, we cannot say we are really solving the boson sampling problem in a general sense (the sizes of m and n are too large to allow for experimental implementation with a small enough error to determine the ouput distribution for any desired S) but, crucially, we can obtain the output photon distribution for a randomly fabricated S R matrix under different challenge states |ψ C .
The challenges are the problems BS(ψ C , S R ) for a series of input states with n photons.
A. Unclonability
The physical aspect of unclonability can be quantified. Most PUFs rely on the difficulty of making exact replicas of certain systems. For a known variability in the magnitude we measure, we can establish a decision threshold to determine whether to accept the response as valid or not. Usually, there is some form of digitization and the Hamming distance of the resulting bits is asked to be small for subsequent measurements of the same token, but large for different tokens [2, 54] .
In boson sampling, deviations from the matrix S for which we want to find the output distribituion have been studied together with experimental noise and imperfections in the light sources and in the detectors (due to dark count rates and other problems). The noise in S comes from the impossibility of fabricating a linear system exactly according to specification. Small imperfections in the components combine and there is a limit to the actual precision we can achieve.
There are multiple results on the resistance of boson sampling to noise. Unless otherwise stated, we assume m n 2 . This is known as the no-collision regime where the probability of two photons going out the same output port is negligible and for which there is a proof boson sampling is hard for classical computers, even in approximate form as long as some reasonable additional assumptions hold [3] .
The different known results will be presented using the usual Bachmann-Landau notation, which describes the growth of two functions g(x) and f (x) as x grows to infinity. In the large x limit, g(x) = O(f (x)) means there is a finite constant M > 0 for which
f (x) → 0; g(x) = Ω(f (x)) means there is a constant δ > 0 for which
f (x) ≥ δ; and g(x) = ω(f (x)) means
f (x) → ∞. On the positive side, it is known that, for an error Ã − A op ≤ in each elementary gate, with A the intended scattering matrix andÃ the actual one, the overall error in the output distributions is [51] : In terms of unclonability, we are more concerned with lower bounds. If our elementary operations have an average fidelity F = 1−ε 2 with respect to the desired unitary, Leverrier and Garcia-Patron [52] have shown that the distance between the output distributions D S and DS of the total system has a lower bound (when averaging over the noise and all the possible unitaries S): 
This bound has the right scale when nε 1. The unclonability of the boson sampling PUF rests on the technical impossibility of producing two linear devices with a close enough output distribution. Imagine we determine a conservative bound on the minimum fabrication error ε we can achieve for each elementary gate. The bound is chosen so that it is considered too technologically demanding or prohibitively expensive, if possible at all, to build an elementary gate with a fidelity F = 1 − ε 2 with respect to the intended gate. In that case, we can choose the parameters n and m so that, even if an attacker characterizes the S of our token perfectly, which can be done efficiently with classical means [35] , any fabricated copy will be guaranteed to have an output distribution with a variation distance with respect to the ouput of the original token above a fixed decision threshold. For a number of photons of the order of 1 ε , Eq. (3) gives a constant minimum distance which can be computed for each pair m and n.
The Gaussian noise model introduced by Kalai and Kindler [50] also gives a nice description of realistic sources of noise in experimental implementations and helps to explore the limitations of boson sampling. Imagine we want to implement the elementary gate A. Then the corresponding noisy element for a noise level (which can include errors in the sources or in the fabrication) can be written as:Ã
where G is a complex Gaussian matrix made of independent and identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables. In this framework, Kalai and Kindler showed that for a noise = ω n . This gives a frontier for unclonability with a photon scaling around 1 .
B. Unpredictability
Software cloning protection comes from the difficulty of classical simulation. In principle, boson sampling in a perfect setting cannot be efficiently simulated on a classical computer.
Noisy boson sampling can be simulated. In the Gaussian noise model, Kalai and Kindler proved that, in boson sampling where D S is close to DS, classical simulation of the output distribution is possible for a noise level = Ω(1) [50] . However, as noted by Shchesnovich [53] , classical simulation is still computationally infeasible for noisy boson sampling with = o 1 n when the output distribution DS is not close to the noiseless matrix output distribution D S . In this case, we have a fixed distribution which cannot be predicted classically, which is enough to show quantum computational supremacy and in PUFs.
In the boson sampling PUF we are not interested in solving a general problem. We just need a unique device. This changes the noise model a bit. We assume that, once we have fabricated a linear optical device, it will be stable. For instance, using integrated optics we might get errors in the fabrication of each elementary gate, but environmental changes, say in temperature, will have a smaller effect.
The output distribution for this matrix S will still suffer noise from imperfect sources and detectors. We will get the same classically unpredictable output distribution as long as this experimental error has a noise level = o 1 n [53] . Losses are the major challenge for boson sampling. In the no-collision regime and using the usual O(n log m) depth implementation of random unitaries S [3] , the exponential losses found in fiber, integrated optics or free space implementations are enough to make the output distribution predictable using efficient classical algorithms [55] . Essentially, if the surviving photon number is below O ( √ n) the output can be predicted [56] . For all the known implementations which allow to construct the required Gaussian unitaries, the depth O(n log m) and the no-collision condition n 2 m result in either less than O ( √ n) surviving photons or a system with small values of n and m which can be simulated in a relatively short time in a classical computer even for a perfect implementation.
This can be circumvented for PUFs, where we can work outside the no-collision regime. A brief rough calculation shows that, for reasonable values, we can avoid simulation. We look at the frontier where
for a total transmission T = τ D , where each element has a transmission 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. For the usual implementation of depth D = O(n log m), up to a constant, we require that
Now imagine a high enough number of photons n = 100 so that the perfect evolution cannot be simulated in a reasonable time and m = 2n. Then, log n 2n log m > −τ
would hold for a transmission τ = 0.999 per elementary gate, which could be achieved with low-loss integrated optics [57] [58] [59] . We can recast the results in terms of the depth of the linear system. We consider a linear optical system with n = km γ photons for m modes, 0 < k < 1 and 0 < γ ≤ 1. Then, the output distribution is close to that of an input thermal state (they have a variation distance smaller than δ) and can be predicted classically for a circuit depth above [55] 
Imagine we require a distance δ = 0.1 (we have a smaller threshold in the variation distance to accept a token as valid). For our example with m = 2n, k = 0.5, γ = 1, n = 100 and τ = 0.999, D * ≈ 3799 while n log(m) ≈ 530. This example shows practical systems could be in the right order of magnitude. While n 2 m is not necessary for unclonability, for more than about √ m output photons, the probability of multiple photons in the same output can no longer be neglected. If we need to add photon number resolving detectors at the output, the experimental setup becomes more involved, but it is still possible with different existing technologies [60] [61] [62] [63] . Nevertheless, the mean photon number at each output can be kept close to 1 if the surviving photons are close to √ m. In the frontier example we have given (for n = 100, m = 200, depth 100 log 200 ≈ 530 and 0.1% loss per element), the mean ouput photon number is 55.85, which is still a bit large, but there is some room depending on the exact configuration. For instance, for 0.4% losses the mean photon number is close to 12 and D * ≈ 949. Notice that this would only escape recent simulation attacks like [53, 55, 56, 64, 65] , but there is no proof a classical model is impossible. Ideally, we would like to use a clear no simulation bound. The Gaussian noise model can also describe losses. A noise level is equivalent to a constant loss in an optical system with total transmission T = 1 − [53] . We would like to use no-go bounds, like the unsimulability result of Shchenovich for an error = o 1 n , but it is only valid for the no-collision regime. Similarly, other bounds suffer a scaling problem with losses.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
These limitations offer a way to implement a boson sampling PUF. We consider there is a technological level such that there is a minimum fabrication noise (no one can manufacture an optical system with a better precision in the final gate S) and a technical noise which includes the effects of imperfect operation (photon distinguishability, noise, losses. . . ).
When designing a boson sampling PUF system, there are three important steps:
1. Fabrication. In order to have unclonable tokens, we choose a reasonable threshold δ th for the distance between the output distributions so that D S − DS ≥ δ th for tokens S andS attempting to approximate the same unitary under a fabrication noise , but which can be achieved for repeated measurements under a technical noise .
The tolerances in each element due to imperfect fabrication can be included in models that derive realistic bounds on the total error in the final operator [66] , which allow us to fix a working value for . We can choose a security margin and increase our estimated to account for more technologically advanced adversaries and determine which fabrication precision would be too costly to be considered practical for the attacker. Once we have set the threshold and error parameters, we can fabricate the unique tokens choosing a size (n, m) for which the output distributions have a distance above the threshold.
2. Choice of the challenges. Before distributing the PUFs, we need to record the response to a series of predefined challenges. Any strong PUF protocol needs a large number of independent challenges to prevent an attacker from recording the responses to a particular set of challenges and using them to emulate the token in future challenges.
If we wanted to use the full m+n−1 n possible inputs we would need implementing any arbitrary m × m unitary, which requires O(m 2 ) gates [67, 68] . The circuit depth O(n log m), which is desirable to avoid problems with losses and for simplicity, comes from considering the n photons come into fixed modes (usually the first n) [3] .
In order to balance the need for multiple challenges and the desirable smaller depth, we can choose for the challenges the set of states with n photons in the first 2n modes (assuming m > 2n, which is valid for the usual regimes). For n photons coming into n separate inputs chosen at random from a total of m n 2 , the necessary circuit depth becomes O(m log m) [69] . The number of possible challenges is given by the possible ways to distribute n photons into 2n positions, which is
as for k ≥ 0,
We have more than 2 n possible challenges, giving the desired growth in the challenge number. The depth of the optical circuit, however, is, at most, doubled. Each challenge is essentially a new problem. The method is similar to scattershot boson sampling, where the inputs are not fixed. Scattershot boson sampling is equivalent to boson sampling in terms of classical complexity and the proof for its hardness includes showing that each of the proposed challenges has an output distribution as difficult to simulate classicaly as the standard boson sampling outputs [70, 71] .
3. Identification. When a verifier is presented with a token, it will produce a random challenge by sending one possible ordering of the n photons into the m modes. After a small number of measurements of the output modes, at most polynomial in m and n [3, 72] , the verifier can approximate the output distribution and compare it to the recorded response to the issued challenge.
If the variation distance between the measured distribution D C M and the recorded distribution D C R for that challenge is smaller than the selected threshold δ th , the token is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected.
VII. FEASIBILITY, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The proposed protocol gives a direct way to turn any successful boson sampling experiment into an identification system. As long as there is a minimum fabrication error, the linear optics tokens cannot be cloned within the required precision. The main advantage with respect to other PUFs is that there is a proof of the classical hardness of simulation attacks. An attacker would need access to a medium or large scale quantum computer.
As soon as there is a valid optical implementation of boson sampling, it can be taken to the unclonable region by increasing the size of the problem (number of photons and modes). While this poses a problem to obtain a clean output distribution and noise becomes more important, the use in PUFs is more forgiving: we do not need to be close to the output distribution of the underlying unitary S describing the system, only a repeatable output which cannot be classically simulated. The fabricated S is, by definition, perfect and we only need to worry about technical noise in photon generation and detection and experimental inestabilities.
At the moment of writing, losses prevent boson sampling experiments to achieve true computational supremacy [53, 55, 56, 64, 65, 73] . However, for PUFs the situation might be less critical. The use as a PUF removes the need to fabricate arbitrary unitaries S even approximately. It is only the attacker who needs to fabricate a detailed reproduction and must also get hold of the token or otherwise characterize its scattering matrix. As an alternative to free space configurations or optical integrated circuits, we could try and use random media as the scatterer. For discrete input and output locations, the quantum evolution of the photons is also described from a scattering matrix [19] . If random media of a certain fixed depth can offer random Gaussian matrices they would be enough for a boson sampling PUF with the advantage of having reduced losses. This is not a universal solution to boson sampling. For computational supremacy we need to be able to approximate any S on demand, but this is not necessary for our application.
Apart from that, the smaller values of n and m for which losses are not so high to make classical simulation efficient, but allow for a brute force classical attack [55] , could be enough for certain PUFs protocols which only require an asymmetry in the time for a response to a challenge (much faster for the actual physical system than for a simulation) [74] . This paper has discussed applications to identification. However, once we have a valid strong PUF, it can be used as a primitive for other security protocols like, for instance, oblivous transfer or key generation, with some limitations [75] [76] [77] [78] . The proposed boson sampling PUF could be easily adapted for these purposes.
